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mitigated. The monetary union may hence lead to higher ﬁscal distortions in
some member countries, depending on governments’ spending targets and on
the change in the degree of uncertainty implied by common monetary policy.
Keywords Monetary union · ﬁscal policy · transparency of monetary policy
· asymmetries.
JEL Classiﬁcation E5 8· E6 3· F3 6 .
∗We are grateful to two referees for their constructive and clarifying comments.
†Corresponding author: University of Siegen, Germany, HWWI and CESifo. Hoeld-
erlinstrasse 3, 57068 Siegen, Germany. Tel: +49-271-740 3184, Fax: +49-271-740 4042,
carsten.hefeker@uni-siegen.de
‡University of Siegen, Hoelderlinstrasse 3, 57068 Siegen, Germany.
11 Introduction
Recent years have seen a strong and nearly universal increase in central
bank transparency (Dincer and Eichengreen 2009). Many central banks,
such as the European Central Bank (ECB), are nonetheless criticized for
their low transparency, being unfavorably compared with the US Federal
Reserve or the Bank of England (Blinder et al. 2001). Most of the literature
considers transparency as crucial for monetary policymaking because it helps
the private sector to better understand the intentions of the central bank
and thereby renders monetary policy more eﬀective and credible (Blinder
1998). Yet, there are also approaches in the literature which argue that
maximum transparency may be suboptimal. In particular, it is shown that
some "creative ambiguity" (Cukierman and Meltzer 1986) can discipline the
private sector, such as wage setters, and induce governments to pursue more
employment friendly policies.
This paper contributes to this debate and provides new theoretical ar-
guments based on the implications of central bank transparency for ﬁscal
policymaking in a monetary union. Our objective in this paper is two-fold.
First, we aim at investigating the eﬀects of transparency on tax decisions.
Second, considering the case of a common monetary policy, we oﬀer some
insights on how its creation or enlargement may aﬀect national ﬁscal policies
in the presence of imperfect central bank transparency. This latter issue
could be of particular interest for the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU)
which will experience important changes due to further enlargements. We
will therefore often refer to the case of EMU, but it should be understood
that our approach is fairly general and could also be applied to other planned
monetary unions in diﬀerent regions of the world, such as in Africa, Latin
America or Asia (Kenen and Meade (2008) discuss such plans).
In developing our arguments, we complement earlier studies in two diﬀer-
ent strands of literature. First, our analysis is related to the huge literature
on monetary policy uncertainty. A series of papers in this literature has in-
vestigated the inﬂuence of uncertainty on central bank behaviour (Brainard
1967; Söderström 2002; Dennis 2007). They show in particular that monet-
ary authorities tend to act more carefully if there is uncertainty about the
transmission of monetary policy (Gros and Hefeker 2002; Benigno 2004). The
focus in this paper however is on how domestic agents react to uncertainty
about the central bank’s behaviour.1 In this line of research, Sorensen (1991),
Grüner (2002), Grüner et al. (2005) and Hefeker (2008) demonstrate that
greater uncertainty about monetary policy may discipline wage setters and
thereby improve labour market performance.
A player that has so far received relatively little attention in the literature
is the ﬁscal authority, and only a few contributions have combined the issue
1This literature is much too broad to be completely referenced here. See Eijﬃnger and
Hoeberichts (2000), Winkler (2000), Geraats (2002) and Eijﬃnger and van der Cruijsen
(2007) for surveys.
2of central bank transparency with ﬁscal policymaking. Hughes Hallett and
Viegi (2003) develop a monetary-ﬁscal policy game to investigate the eﬀects
of transparency, depending on whether it corresponds to political transpar-
ency — where the central bank’s preferences or priorities are clearly deﬁned —
or economic transparency — where conditioning information, shocks or target
values are made clear.2 Ciccarone, Di Bartolomeo and Marchetti (2007) focus
on political transparency in a framework with supply-side ﬁscal policy and
strategic wage setting. However, none of these papers has explicitly examined
how ﬁscal policymakers react to central bank transparency. Our contribu-
tion aims to ﬁll this void and to show how this reaction is transformed in a
monetary union.
The second literature our analysis is linked to is the broad discussion
about monetary and ﬁscal interactions in a monetary union.3 We make use
of the framework developed by Beetsma and Bovenberg (1998) to study how
the formation or the enlargement of a monetary union aﬀects tax decisions
and macroeconomic outcomes in the member countries. Beetsma and Boven-
berg have demonstrated that tax distortions decrease with the monetary uni-
ﬁcation as the strategic position of each individual ﬁscal player vis-à-vis the
larger central bank is weakened. We analyse the robustness of this result
with respect to two important assumptions.
First, we assume that the central bank is not fully transparent about
its preferences, so that the monetary reaction to taxation is to some degree
uncertain for governments.4 The issue of uncertainty is particularly relevant
when examining the context of a monetary union because the decisions of a
common central bank reﬂect all kinds of interactions among diﬀerent mem-
ber countries and may therefore be less predictable than those of a national
central bank. As shown by Goldberg and Klein (2005) for instance, the per-
ception of the European Central Bank’s reaction parameters has changed over
time, suggesting that markets have reﬁned their view of its characteristics
and objectives over time.
Second, we allow for cross-country asymmetries in ﬁscal policymaking.
More precisely, we assume that governments in the member countries have
diﬀerent public spending targets. These assymetries may have an impact on
the common monetary policy and therefore feedback on the optimal national
ﬁscal policies. Such asymmetries could for instance reﬂect diﬀerent spending
targets due to catch-up processes in infrastrucure, preferences for more or
less generous social policies, or diﬀerences between richer and poorer states.
It appears from this set up that monetary uncertainty forces governments
to moderate taxation, thereby reducing average inﬂation and output distor-
2A similar distinction can be found in Geraats (2002) and Demertzis and Hughes Hallett
(2007).
3This literature includes seminal contributions by, for instance, von Hagen and Süp-
pel (1994), Beetsma and Bovenberg (1998, 1999), Beetsma and Uhlig (1999), Dixit and
Lambertini (2001, 2003) and Uhlig (2003).
4Hence, the concept of uncertainty used here refers to political transparency.
3tions. Hence, maximum transparency seems not optimal from this point of
view. The moderating eﬀect of uncertainty however is mitigated with the
move to a common monetary policy. Monetary uniﬁcation may translate
into greater tax distortions in some member countries, depending on their
governments’ spending targets and on the potential change in uncertainty
that accompanies the change of monetary regime. A possible response to
these adverse eﬀects could be to deliberately increase uncertainty via lower
transparency in the larger currency area. This solution should nevertheless
be used cautiously as it could prove to be counterproductive for countries
with a high public spending target.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. The next section
analyses the eﬀects of uncertainty on ﬁscal decisions in a closed economy.
Section 3 extends this analysis to a monetary union and derives the eﬀects
of a change in the monetary regime on macroeconomic outcomes. Two cases
are considered: The benchmark case of a symmetric monetary union and the
more complex case of a monetary union with heterogeneous ﬁscal policies.
Section 4 concludes.
2 Policy choices in the closed economy
2.1 The model
This section presents a model in line with Beetsma and Bovenberg (1998),
extended to allow for imperfect political transparency of the central bank as
in Ciccarone et al. (2007).
We begin by considering a closed economy consisting of three players: the
central bank, the government and the private sector.5 The timing of the game
is as follows. First, inﬂation expectations are determined rationally.6 Then,
t h eg o v e r n m e n ts e t st a x e sa n dﬁnally the central bank selects the inﬂation
rate. Since in practice monetary policy can be adjusted more quickly than
ﬁscal decisions, we assume that the government, when setting taxes, takes
account of the central bank’s expected reaction. Accordingly, the government
acts as a Stackelberg leader vis-à-vis the central bank.
The output supply function is described by:
x = π − π
e − τ (1)
where π and πe are the actual and expected inﬂation rates respectively; τ
5Alternatively, one might think about this as the current monetary union, to be ex-
panded later to new member states.
6As in Alesina and Tabellini (1987), the private sector can be thought of either as pop-
ulated by small uncoordinated agents or by a centralised trade union. If the union pursues
a real wage target only, both assumptions lead to the same results. For an analogous study
to ours (in the closed economy set up) but where the monopoly union aims at stabilising
both real wages and output, see Ciccarone et al. (2007).
4deﬁnes the tax rate.7 As can be seen from this relation, unexpected inﬂation,
by eroding real wages, induces ﬁrms to augment their demand for labour and
thus their production. Greater taxation of the ﬁrms’ revenues, on the con-
trary, discourages production. Hence, as in Beetsma and Bovenberg (1998,
1999) for instance, ﬁscal policy has a negative impact on aggregate supply
via taxation. In line with most literature, we thus assume that taxation is
used for consumption only and has no productive eﬀect on supply.8




2 + β (g − ˜ g)
2 (2)
where g and ˜ g respectively denote the actual and targeted levels of pub-
lic expenditures as shares of output. The government wishes to minimise
the deviations of inﬂation, output and public spending from their respect-
ive targets. For convenience, we normalise the target levels of inﬂation and
output at zero. The public spending target ˜ g, however, is positive which
is crucial for our analysis. This implies that the government will tolerate
some tax distortions in exchange for a positive amount of public spending.
Since expenditures correspond to public consumption — such as public sector
wages and other current government spending — the target ˜ g could reﬂect
the government’s view of the optimal size of the public sector, or political
economic aspects such as the government’s interest in boosting expenditures
to increase reelection chances (Brender and Drazen 2005). Parameters α and
β respectively measure the weights of the inﬂation and spending objectives
relative to the weight of the output objective.
In setting public expenditures, the government faces the following budget
constraint:
g = τ (3)
This equation can be interpreted as a long-run balanced budget require-
ment where taxation is the only source of ﬁnancing public expenditure.
Hence, we abstract from the issues of debts and deﬁcits, as in Beetsma and
Bovenberg (1998) for instance, and we also exclude seignoriage as a source of
ﬁnance.9 Hence, our perspective is a long to medium term analysis. In the
European context this is reﬂected in the Stability and Growth Pact which
mandates a balanced budget over the cycle.
The central bank cares about deviations of inﬂation and output from
their respective targets (set equal to zero). We assume that the central bank
7A complete derivation of this output equation can be found in, e.g., Alesina and
Tabellini (1987) or Beetsma and Bovenberg (1998).
8The variable τ could also be interpreted as the tax rate net of public investment so
as to capture the productivity enhancing role of public expenditures. See for instance
Ismihan and Ozkan (2004) who explicitly consider the composition of public spending by
distinguishing between public sector consumption and investment.
9For an intertemporal budget constraint where government expenditures can also be
ﬁnanced by public debt, see for instance Beetsma and Bovenberg (1999), Beetsma and
Uhlig (1999) or Beetsma and Debrun (2007).
5is independent from the government so that it does not take account of the
government’s spending target. To specify the central bank’s loss function
that encompasses the issue of monetary uncertainty, we draw on Ciccarone
et al. (2007):
LCB =( I −  )π
2 +( 1+ )x
2 (4)
where I measures the central bank’s dislike of inﬂation. It seems realistic
t os u p p o s et h a ti ta t t a c h e sah i g h e rp r i o r i t yt op r i c es t a b i l i t yt h a nn a t i o n a l
governments do, as many central banks, like the ECB, have been explicitly
given a mandate for price stability. More formally, this means that: I>α .
Monetary uncertainty arises as the central bank may not fully be transparent
in terms of its preferences. This idea is captured by the presence of a random
variable  ,w i t h  ∈ [−1,I], E( )=0and E( 2)=σ2.10 The government and
the private sector are on average able to predict the monetary authority’s
preferences but there is some uncertainty around them. This is measured by
the parameter σ2, which we refer to as the degree of monetary uncertainty.
An increase in σ2 means the central bank becomes more opaque and that its
behavior is therefore harder to predict.






e + τ) (5)
As usually in this type of analysis, inﬂation is increasing in expected
inﬂation and taxation because the central bank aims to compensate their
negative output eﬀects. Inﬂation is also increasing in (1 +  ), the stochastic
weight the bank puts on its output objective, but decreasing in its aversion
to inﬂation I.
The government determines ﬁscal decisions by minimising its expected
loss function E(LG) subject to the budget constraint (3) and the central
bank’s reaction (5). This yields the following tax rate :
τ =
˜ gI(1 + I)β
α(1 + σ2)+σ2 + I (I + β + Iβ)
(6)
Clearly, taxation is increasing in the spending target ˜ g as well as in β,
the relative importance the government gives to its spending objective. A
higher weight, α, attributed to the price stability objective, however, leads
the government to reduce taxes so as to limit the central bank’s inﬂationary
reaction.
The equilibrium values for inﬂation, output and public expenditure devi-
10Note that σ2 ∈ [0,I] as the random variable   is deﬁned in a compact set and has an
expected value of zero. See the Appendix of Ciccarone et al. (2007) for further details.
6ations are respectively given by:
π =
˜ g (1 + I)β
α(1 + σ2)+σ2 + I (I + β + Iβ)
(1 +  ) (7)
x =
− ˜ g (1 + I)β
α(1 + σ2)+σ2 + I (I + β + Iβ)
(I −  ) (8)
g − ˜ g =
− ˜ g [α(1 + σ2)+σ2 + I2]
α(1 + σ2)+σ2 + I (I + β + Iβ)
(9)
As can be seen from Eqs. (7) through (9), average inﬂation is above its
target (zero) while average output and public expenditures are below their
targets (respectively zero and ˜ g). As a response to higher taxation, ﬁrms
reduce their production and the central bank implements an expansive mon-
etary policy. Yet, taxes remain insuﬃcient to ﬁnance the desired level of
public spending, as the government trades oﬀ the utility gain from increased
expenditures with the losses from higher average inﬂation and output distor-
tions.
2.2 The eﬀects of monetary uncertainty
After having determined the equilibrium outcomes, we proceed to examine
the eﬀects of monetary uncertainty on the average level and the variability
of economic performances. Our results are summarised in the following pro-
positions.
Proposition 1. Monetary uncertainty reduces taxes, average inﬂation and
output distortions but increases deviations of public expenditures from their
target level.
Proof. T a x e sa n da v e r a g ei n ﬂation decline in σ2 as can be seen respectively
from Eqs. (6) and (7) while, according to Eq. (8), average output increases
with σ2.
Concerning the impact of uncertainty on public expenditure deviations,
we obtain:
∂(g − ˜ g)
∂σ2 =
−˜ gI (1 + I)(1 + α)β
[α(1 + σ2)+σ2 + I (I + β + Iβ)]
2 < 0
Proposition 1 can be explained by Brainard’s (1967) principle of policy
caution. When there is great uncertainty about the central bank’s prefer-
ences, the government can not rely on the monetary response to its ﬁscal
decisions. Too strong a reaction of the central bank would exacerbate the
costs of a given increase in taxes in terms of inﬂation, whereas too weak a
reaction would exacerbate the costs in terms of reduced output. The gov-
ernment therefore acts more carefully and abstains from raising taxes. This,
in turn, brings about lower output distortions and lower average inﬂation.
7However, as taxes decrease, so does the public expenditure level, pushing the
government further away from its desired level of spending.
Central bank opacity could eventually prove to be desirable for govern-
ments provided they are not too concerned about their spending objective
(β low).11 This also suggests that, if society is assumed to share the govern-
ment’s objectives, maximum transparency is not optimal from a social point
of view.
Proposition 2. Inﬂation and output variability will increase with
monetary uncertainty if the central bank is suﬃciently inﬂation
averse.
Proof. Using V (π)=E[π − E (π)]2 and V (x)=E[x − E (x)]2,w eg e t






˜ g2(1 + I)2β
2 [α − σ2 (1 + α)+I (I + β + Iβ)]
{α(1 + σ2)+σ2 + I (I + β + Iβ)}
3
This derivative is positive if:




Given that σ2 ∈ [0,I] (see footnote 11), the condition is likely to hold.12
Hence, uncertainty about central bank preferences may translate into
higher variability of output and inﬂation if uncertainty is not too high. The
intuition of this result is as follows. Opacity of monetary policy triggers two
countervailing eﬀects on macroeconomic volatility: a direct positive eﬀect
as less transparency is associated with greater uncertainty in the monetary
reaction; and an indirect negative eﬀe c td u et ot h ef a c tt h a to p a c i t yl e a d st o
lower taxation and in this way contributes to reduce macroeconomic variab-
ility. If the degree of monetary uncertainty, σ2, is not extremely high, the
direct positive eﬀect prevails.
Moreover, from rewriting condition (10) as f(I,β) ≡
α+I(I+β+Iβ)
1+α >σ 2,w e
observe that
∂f
∂I > 0. The greater the degree of central bank conservatism,
I, the more uncertainty is likely to increase macroeconomic variability. If
the bank is highly concerned about price stability, the consequences of its
opacity on inﬂation are relatively low. Accordingly, the decreasing impact
of uncertainty on taxe decisions, and thus on macroeconomic volatility, is
mitigated.
11In integrating Eqs. (7), (8) and (9) into the government’s expected loss func-
tion and diﬀerentiating with respect to σ2,w eo b s e r v et h a t
∂E(LG)




12As u ﬃcient condition for it to hold is I>1.
8Besides, we also observe that:
∂f
∂β > 0. The more the government cares
about its spending objective (β large), the less prone it is to reduce taxes in
response to monetary uncertainty. This means that a higher β is associated
with a lower ’tax-decreasing’ eﬀect of uncertainty and thus with a higher
probability that uncertainty increases macroeconomic variability.
3 Policy choices in the monetary union
We now shift our attention to the interactions between uncertainty and ﬁscal
policymaking in a monetary union. It latter is composed of two countries
(indexed by i, ∀i =1 ,2) which may either be identical (as for instance the
founding members of the EMU) or present diﬀerences in their economic and
institutional development (this might be thought of as the enlargement of
the present EMU to new member states).
In the latter case, we also allow for cross-country asymmetries in the
public spending targets. As argued above, this could reﬂect diﬀerences in
the member countries’ need for public investment, their preferences over the
size of the welfare state, or political economic considerations.13
In addition, we assume that the monetary union may induce changes in
the members’ degree of central bank transparency. As Dincer and Eichen-
green (2009) show, degrees of transparency diﬀer widely across countries,
including those that aim at joining the EMU or plan for other regional mon-
etary unions. It is hence possible that the move to a larger currency area
may create additional uncertainty in countries where the national central
bank has been highly transparent. This assumption seems realistic at least
f o ra ni n i t i a lp e r i o dw h e r et h ep u b l i ca n dt h eg o v e r n m e n t sn e e ds o m et i m et o
assess the preferences of the larger monetary authority. Alternatively, other
member states may see their degree of uncertainty fall with their entry in
the union. This idea could be justiﬁed by the fact that, during a transitional
period, candidates for an entry to the union experience some extra uncer-
tainty due to their adjustment to the new monetary regime which is resolved
upon entry. Another interpretation would be that the well-established central
bank of the monetary union is more predictable than the entering member’s
national central banks with, for instance frequently changing governors.
With the monetary union (superscript U), monetary policy is centralised
in the hands of a larger central bank which is independent from national
governments. The common central bank sets a common rate of inﬂation,
πU, prevailing in the whole monetary area since the member countries’ good
markets are assumed to be perfectly integrated. Its loss function reﬂects its
concern about price stability (the inﬂation target is assumed to be zero) and
13Note that the relative weights attributed by governments to inﬂation and public spend-
ing deviations (respectively denoted by parameters α and β in the governments’ loss func-
tion) are assumed to be identical across countries. Allowing for diﬀerent spending targets
suﬃces to derive asymmetric ﬁscal policy choices.
9average output, xU, in the union:
LCCB =
¡











where  U is a random variable with  U ∈ [−1,I], E( U)=0and E( U)2 =
σ2
U; xU =( x1 + x2)/2 represents the average output in the union.14 The
presence of the random variable  U indicates that there is some uncertainty
surrounding the common central bank’s preferences as well. This uncertainty
is measured by the variance σ2
U.
In minimising Eq. (11) subject to the member countries’ output function










where πUe is the expected common inﬂation rate and ¯ τ =( τ1 + τ2)/2,t h e
average tax rate in the union.
Like the national central bank, the common central bank reacts to the
ﬁscal authorities’ behaviour. Although it is independent from governments,
national tax policies still aﬀect its decisions via their impact on average
output.
As before, when setting its tax rate, each government in the union faces
the budget constraint represented by Eq. (3). Hence, the government in
country i (i =1 ,2) chooses the tax rate to minimise its expected losses
E(LG,i) (with LG,i deﬁned in Eq. (2)) subject to (3) and (12), taking the
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U =1+2 ( I +β +Iβ) > 0. The index j refers to country i’s partner
in the union.
This expression reveals that taxes are increasing in the domestic spending
target but falling in the partner country’s spending target. In particular, tax
rates turn out to be strategic substitutes since higher taxation abroad triggers
pressures on the common inﬂation that force the domestic government to
lower its own tax rate.
3.1 The symmetric case
The simple case of a symmetric monetary union implies that both member
countries have identical public spending targets: ˜ g1 =˜ g2 =˜ g.F u r t h e r m o r e ,
our aim in this benchmark case is to highlight the direct eﬀect of monetary
14In an earlier version of the paper, we have considered asymmetries in the member
countries’ relative economic weight. This does not substantially modify the results.
10integration. This eﬀect is ‘direct’ in the sense that all relevant monetary
parameters are assumed to be unaﬀected by the regime change. In particular,
we suppose that the move to a larger currency area has no repercussion on the
degree of uncertainty in the participating countries: σ2
U = σ2
i = σ2, ∀i =1 ,2.
In substituting these parameter values into (13), we obtain the equilib-





2˜ gI(1 + I)β
α(1 + σ2)+σ2 + I [1 + 2(I + β + Iβ)]
(14)
We can now derive the implications of the union for ﬁscal policy decisions
and, through it, for macroeconomic performances in the participating coun-
t r i e s .F o r m a l l y ,t h i si sd o n eb ye x a m i n i n gt h ed i ﬀerence (τU −τ), ∀i =1 ,2.
Once this diﬀerence is known, it is straightforward to derive the eﬀects of
the union on the average levels of output and inﬂa t i o na sw e l la so np u b l i c
spending.
The comparison of expression (14) with the equilibrium tax rate observed
before monetary union (6) leads to the following propositions.
Proposition 3. Under the assumption of symmetric countries, the mon-
etary union increases taxes, average inﬂation, output distortions and public
spending if:
i) uncertainty, σ2,i sh i g h
ii) the central bank’s aversion to inﬂation, I,i sl o w
iii) the relative weight that governments attribute to their inﬂation objective,
α,i sh i g h .
Proof. T h ec o m p a r i s o no fE q . ( 6 )w i t h( 1 4 )r e v e a l st h a tt h eu n i o nh a sa
positive impact on taxes and thus on average inﬂation, output distortions






Proposition 3 qualiﬁes the main result obtained by Beetsma and Boven-
berg (1998) who demonstrate that the monetary union may encourage na-
tional ﬁscal authorities to reduce taxation. According to result i),t h i ss c e n -
ario only occurs for suﬃciently low degrees of uncertainty but disappears
when the central bank’s opacity, σ2, is high enough.
To understand the intuition underlying Proposition 3, we note that the
overall impact of the monetary union on ﬁscal policies (and thereby on eco-
nomic outcomes) is the consequence of two opposite mechanisms. The ﬁrst
has already been highlighted by Beetsma and Bovenberg (1998). It hinges
on the assumption that central banks care more about price stability than
governments do (I>α ). In this case, the latter are induced to set high
taxes since they know that the central bank will respond by raising inﬂation
11so as to counteract the adverse eﬀects of excessive taxation on output. Yet,
in the monetary union, governments’ ﬁscal choices have a smaller impact on
monetary policy. The union indeed reduces the inﬂationary consequences of
individual tax increases, thereby rendering them more costly in terms of re-
duced output. Consequently, governments are forced to moderate taxation.
Through this mechanism — which we lab e lt h e‘ c o n v e n t i o n a lm e c h a n i s m ’—
monetary union translates into lower average inﬂation, output distortions
and public expenditures.
However, taking account of the fact that the central bank’s reaction may
not be fully predictable, we ﬁnd an additional mechanism through which
monetary union is likely to increase taxes. In the union, governments per-
ceive the uncertainty surrounding monetary decisions to a lesser extent, and
the moderating impact of uncertainty on ﬁscal decisions is accordingly mit-
igated. This in turn encourages higher taxation. The strength of this second
mechanism — which we refer to as the ‘uncertainty mechanism’ — is calib-
rated by the degree of uncertainty, σ2. Hence, for suﬃciently high values of
σ2, the ‘uncertainty mechanism’ prevails, and monetary union raises average
inﬂation, output distortions and public expenditures. This mechanism will
also prevail when the central bank is rather populist (I small) and/or when
the governments’ concern for output relative to price stability is not too high
(i.e. α large).
This result allows us to brieﬂyt o u c ho nt h ei s s u eo ft h ew e l f a r ee ﬀects
of a monetary union. Proposition 3 also suggests that a union characterised
by a relatively opaque central bank could make governments and society —
if one assumes that governments incorporate social preferences — worse oﬀ.
This is likely to happen if they attach great importance to price and output
stability so that the gain from the increased expenditure level is more than
compensated by the losses due to higher inﬂation and output distortions.
In this case, it could be beneﬁcial to reduce transparency as a response to
monetary integration. This would allow to counteract the reduction in the
governments’ perception of uncertainty that results from monetary union.
3.2 The asymmetric case
We now turn to the asymmetric case where we allow for cross-country diﬀer-
ences in the targeted level of public expenditures, so that: ˜ g1 6=˜ g2.M o r e o v e r ,
in this section we also consider the possibility that the monetary union may
induce changes in the countries’ degree of uncertainty. As argued above,
we suppose that some members will experience an increase in uncertainty
whereas others see their degree of uncertainty fall. Formally, this implies:
σ2
i ≷ σ2
U (∀i =1 ,2).
Taking account of these asymmetries, we can examine how the eﬀects
of the union vary across the diﬀerent member countries, depending on their
spending target and on the change in monetary uncertainty that they exper-
12ience. Comparison of the tax rate (13) with the one observed in country i
(∀i =1 ,2) before monetary union (Eq. (6)) delivers the following proposi-
tion.
Proposition 4. T h em o n e t a r yu n i o nm a yi n c r e a s et a x e s ,o u t p u td i s t o r t i o n s
and public spending in country i if:
i) it is associated with a reduction in the degree of uncertainty in country i
ii) country i has a relatively higher spending target than its partner in the
union.
Proof. For country i, it appears that τU
i − τi > 0, E(xU
i − xi) < 0 and
gU
i − gi > 0 (where variables without superscript U refer to the situation
before the monetary union) if the following expression is positive:
−˜ giI(I − α)[1+2(I + β + Iβ)] (16)





















2 + I (1 + I)β
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This expression is composed of three terms. The ﬁr s ti sn e g a t i v ei fI>α ,
i.e. when the central bank is more inﬂation averse than governments. The
two last terms, nonetheless, are positive when respectively: σ2
i −σ2
U > 0 and
˜ gi − ˜ gj > 0.I f t h e s e d i ﬀerences are suﬃciently large, the whole expression
may be positive.
Proposition 4 states that countries characterized by a relatively high
spending target and for which the union is likely to imply less uncertainty
may experience greater tax distortions, but also attain a higher spending
level. On the contrary, in countries which have a relatively modest spending
target and where uncertainty increases, taxes and output distortions will fall.
There is hence a polarization between countries in the sense that those with
ac o n s e r v a t i v eﬁscal policy will further reduce taxation and vice versa.
For an intuitive account of this result, we must look at the three diﬀerent
mechanisms underlined in expression (16). The ﬁrst term has already been
explained above and referred to as the ‘conventional mechanism’. It implies
that the monetary union favours tax moderation provided central banks are
suﬃciently more concerned about price stability than governments (I>α ).
This conventional tax-decreasing eﬀect of the union, however, may be oﬀset
by the two other mechanisms operating in the opposite direction.
The second term in expression (16) suggests an increase in taxes if the
monetary uniﬁcation implies a reduction of uncertainty. Since the larger
central bank runs a much more transparent and predictable monetary policy
than the national banks did, the moderating inﬂuence from uncertainty is
reduced and governments are encouraged to raise taxation.
The third term in (16) implies an increase in tax distortions in countries
with a substantially higher spending target than their partners. This hap-
13pens because tax rates are strategic substitutes. Governments with a high
spending target take advantage of their partners’ tax moderation, and thus of
the resulting lower inﬂationary pressure (on average and in terms of variance)
to set higher taxes. Moreover, the strength of this eﬀect is positively related
to the degree of uncertainty in the union. The higher is σ2
U, the greater is the
governments’ perception of the decline in inﬂation variability due to the tax
moderation of their partners and the stronger is their tax increase. Hence,
greater uncertainty does not necessarily prove to be beneﬁcial for countries
characterised by a large spending target. This observation somewhat qual-
iﬁes our earlier result (section 3.1) about the tax reducing eﬀect of lower
transparency.
At last, we turn to the eﬀects of the union on inﬂation. Under the as-
sumption of asymmetric national ﬁscal policies, the equilibrium inﬂation rate
observed in the enlarged currency area is given by:
π
U =
(˜ g1 +˜ g2)( 1 + I)β
α(1 + σ2
U)+σ2





Not surprisingly, πU positively depends on the public spending targets in
both countries. Comparing πU with the inﬂa t i o nr a t eo b s e r v e di nc o u n t r y
i (∀i =1 ,2) before its entry into the monetary union delivers the following
proposition.
Proposition 5. Country i m a ye x p e r i e n c ea ni n c r e a s ei nt h ea v e r a g ei n ﬂa-
tion rate due to the union if its partner country has a relatively high spending
target.
Proof. Comparison of the expected values of (17) and (7) yields:
E(π
U − πi)=( 1+I)β
∙






α(1 + σ2)+σ2 + Iφ
¸
(18)
where φ = I+β+Iβ >0; πi,d e ﬁned in Eq. (7), corresponds to the inﬂation
rate observed in country i before monetary union.
From this expression, it is easy to see that E(πU − πi) is increasing in
˜ gj. Hence, the greater the spending target in country j, the more the union
is likely to raise inﬂation in country i. The intuition underlying this result
is simple. Countries with a large spending target are characterised by high
taxation. As a response the common central bank then conducts a rather
inﬂationary policy, harmful to other countries in the union.
4C o n c l u s i o n
This paper has demonstrated that uncertainty about the monetary author-
ities’ relative preferences for output and inﬂation has a systematic inﬂuence
14on the optimal ﬁscal policies of governments. In particular, we showed that
monetary uncertainty encourages tax moderation and thereby helps to reduce
average inﬂation and output distortions. This result hence makes a case for
some ambiguity in the central bank’s preferences and behaviour. We next
extended this analysis to the case of a monetary union, considering ﬁrst sym-
metric member countries. In the monetary union, governments internalise
the eﬀects of monetary uncertainty to a lesser extent and are therefore likely
to pursue a more aggressive tax policy. It thus appears to be an appropriate
response by the central bank to become less transparent in a larger currency
area.
However, we do not argue that such a deliberate increase in uncertainty
constitutes a systematically eﬃcient solution to the potential tax-increasing
impact of a monetary union. By considering cross-country asymmetries in
the governments’ objectives, we observed that the enlargement may lead to
higher taxation in countries with a relatively large spending target as they
take advantage of their partners’ ﬁscal conservatism. Higher uncertainty in
the union then even strengthens this eﬀect.
Finally, our analysis does not provide any clear-cut argument to the de-
bate about the desirability of central bank transparency. On the contrary, it
underlines the crucial implications of asymmetric ﬁscal policies in the mon-
etary union for the appropriate choice of central bank transparency.
There are several interesting issues we have not incorporated here. First,
we have not allowed for deﬁcits and debt. Extending our setup to a multi-
period model would allow to take account of these issues and to see how the
incentives to run up debt are inﬂuenced by uncertainty. Second, one can take
the model to the data and see if our postulated relation between uncertainty
and ﬁscal policy can be conﬁrmed empirically. These points should be the
subject of further research.
15References
Alesina A, Tabellini G (1987) Rules and discretion with uncoordinated
monetary and ﬁscal policies. Econ Inq 25: 619-630
Beetsma R, Bovenberg A (1998) Monetary union without ﬁscal coordin-
ation may discipline policymakers. J Int Econ 45: 239-258
Beetsma R, Bovenberg A (1999) Does monetary uniﬁcation lead to ex-
cessive debt accumulation? J Public Econ 74: 299-325
Beetsma R, Debrun X (2007) The new Stability and Growth Pact: A ﬁrst
assessment. Eur Econ Rev 51: 453-477
Beetsma R, Uhlig H (1999) An analysis of the Stability and Growth Pact.
Econ J 109: 546-571
Benigno P (2004) Optimal monetary policy in a currency area. J Int
Econ 63: 293-320
Blinder A (1998) Central banking in theory and practice. MIT Press,
Cambridge
Blinder A, Goodhart C, Hildebrand P, Lipton D, Wyplosz C (2001) How
do central banks talk? Geneva Reports on the World Economy 3
Brainard W (1967) Uncertainty and the eﬀectiveness of policy. Am Econ
Rev 57: 411-425
Brender A, Drazen A (2005) Political budget cycles in new versus estab-
lished democracies. J Monet Econ 52: 1271-1295
Ciccarone C, Di Bartolomeo G, Marchetti E (2007) Unions, ﬁscal policy
and central bank transparency. Manch Sch 75: 617-633
Cukierman A, Meltzer A (1986) A theory of ambiguity, credibility and
independence under discretion and asymmetric information. Econometrica
54: 1099-1128
Dennis R (2008) Model uncertainty and monetary policy. Federal Reserve
Bank of San Francisco working paper 2007-9
Demertzis M, Hughes Hallett A (2007) Central bank transparency in
theory and practice. J Macroecon 29: 760-789
Dincer N, Eichengreen B (2009) Central bank transparency: cases, con-
sequences and updates. unpublished manuscript
Dixit A, Lambertini L (2001) Monetary-ﬁscal policy interactions and com-
mitment versus discretion in a monetary union. Eur Econ Rev 45: 977-987
Dixit A, Lambertini L (2003) Symbiosis of monetary and ﬁscal policies
in a monetary union. J Int Econ 60: 235-247
Eijﬃnger S, Hoeberichts M (2000) Central bank accountability and trans-
parency: Theory and some evidence. Bundesbank Discussion Paper 06/11
Eijﬃnger S, van der Cruijsen C (2007) The economic impact of central
bank transparency: A survey. CEPR Discussion Papers 6070
Geraats P (2002) Central bank transparency. Econ J 112: 532-565
Goldberg L, Klein M (2005) Establishing credibility: Evolving percep-
tions of the European Central Bank. NBER Working Paper 11792
16Grüner H P (2002) How much should central banks talk? A new argu-
ment. Econ Lett 77: 195-198
Grüner H P, Hayo B, Hefeker C (2005) Unions, wage setting and monetary
policy uncertainty. ECB Working Paper Series 490
Gros D, Hefeker C (2002) One size must ﬁt all. National divergences in
a monetary union. Ger Econ Rev 3: 242-267
von Hagen J, Süppel R (1994) Central bank constitutions for federal
monetary unions. Eur Econ Rev 38: 774-782
Hefeker C (2008) Uncertainty and wage setting in a monetary union.
Manch Sch 76: 391-404
Hughes Hallett A, Viegi N (2003) Transparency and the strategic use of
private information in monetary policy. Manch Sch 71: 498-520
Ismihan M, Ozkan F G (2004) Does central bank independence lower
inﬂation? Econ Lett 84: 305-309
Kenen P, Meade E (2008) Regional monetary integration. New York:
Cambridge University Press
Söderström U (2002) Monetary policy with uncertain parameters. Scand
J Econ 104: 125-145
Sorensen J (1991) Political uncertainty and macroeconomic performance.
Econ Lett 37
Uhlig H (2003) One money but many ﬁscal policies in Europe: What are
the consequences? In: Buti M (ed) Monetary and ﬁscal policies in EMU.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 29-56
Winkler B (2000) Which kind of transparency: On the need for clarity in
monetary policy making, ECB Working Paper 26.
17